Possibilistic Boolean games: strategic reasoning under incomplete information

Boolean games offer a compact alternative to normal-form games, by encoding the goal of each agent as a propositional formula. In this paper, we show how this framework can be naturally extended to model situations in which agents are uncertain about other agents' goals. We first use uncertainty measures from possibility theory to semantically define (solution concepts to) Boolean games with incomplete information. Then we present a syntactic characterization of these semantics, which can readily be implemented, and we characterize the computational complexity

A Logic for Non-Deterministic Parallel Abstract State Machines

We develop a logic which enables reasoning about single steps of non-deterministic parallel Abstract State Machines (ASMs). Our logic builds upon the unifying logic introduced by Nanchen and St\"ark for reasoning about hierarchical (parallel) ASMs. Our main contribution to this regard is the handling of non-determinism (both bounded and unbounded) within the logical formalism. Moreover, we do this without sacrificing the completeness of the logic for statements about single steps of non-deterministic parallel ASMs, such as invariants of rules, consistency conditions for rules, or step-by-step equivalence of rules.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1602.0748

Towards Collaborative Conceptual Exploration

In domains with high knowledge distribution a natural objective is to create principle foundations for collaborative interactive learning environments. We present a first mathematical characterization of a collaborative learning group, a consortium, based on closure systems of attribute sets and the well-known attribute exploration algorithm from formal concept analysis. To this end, we introduce (weak) local experts for subdomains of a given knowledge domain. These entities are able to refute and potentially accept a given (implicational) query for some closure system that is a restriction of the whole domain. On this we build up a consortial expert and show first insights about the ability of such an expert to answer queries. Furthermore, we depict techniques on how to cope with falsely accepted implications and on combining counterexamples. Using notions from combinatorial design theory we further expand those insights as far as providing first results on the decidability problem if a given consortium is able to explore some target domain. Applications in conceptual knowledge acquisition as well as in collaborative interactive ontology learning are at hand.Comment: 15 pages, 2 figure

Designing minimal effective normative systems with the help of lightweight formal methods

Normative systems (i.e., a set of rules) are an important approach to achieving effective coordination among (often an arbitrary number of) agents in multiagent systems. A normative system should be effective in ensuring the satisfaction of a desirable system property, and minimal (i.e., not containing norms that unnecessarily over-constrain the behaviors of agents). Designing or even automatically synthesizing minimal effective normative systems is highly non-trivial. Previous attempts on synthesizing such systems through simulations often fail to generate normative systems which are both minimal and effective. In this work, we propose a framework that facilitates designing of minimal effective normative systems using lightweight formal methods. Given a minimal effective normative system which coordinates many agents must be minimal and effective for a small number of agents, we start with automatically synthesizing one such system with a few agents. We then increase the number of agents so as to check whether the same design remains minimal and effective. If it is, we manually establish an induction proof so as to lift the design to an arbitrary number of agents

Reasoning about actions meets strategic logics (LORI 2013)

International audienceWe introduce ATLEA, a novel extension of Alternating-time Temporal Logic with explicit actions in the object language. ATLEA allows to reason about abilities of agents under commitments to play certain actions. Pre- and postconditions as well as availability and unavailability of actions can be expressed. We show that the multiagent extension of Reiter’s solution to the frame problem can be encoded into ATLEA. We also consider an epistemic extension of ATLEA. We demonstrate that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to reason about uniform choices of actions. Complexity results for the satisfiability problem of ATLEA and its epistemic extension are given in the paper